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OPINION OF THE COURT 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Elias Eid and Gwen Packard-Eid filed a complaint 
challenging the denial by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) of the I-130 Petition for Alien Relative filed by 
Packard-Eid, a United States citizen, that would accord Eid, 
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her husband and a non-citizen, preference status as the spouse 
of a citizen. The BIA denied the Petition under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1154(c), which requires denying the petitions of aliens who 
had previously received or attempted to receive immigration 
benefits based on a marriage “entered into for the purpose of 
evading the immigration laws.” Eid and Packard-Eid 
contended that, because Eid did not intend to break the law 
through his first marriage, § 1154(c) should not apply to him. 
The District Court disagreed, granting summary judgment for 
the Government on one count of the complaint and dismissed 
the remaining counts for failure to state a claim. Despite facts 
favoring a better result, the statute’s text leads us to conclude 
that neither the District Court nor the BIA erred, as, among 
other things, the intent to enter into a marriage solely to gain 
immigration benefits is sufficient to establish intent to evade 
the immigration laws. 
I. Background 
A. Factual and Administrative Background 
 Eid is a Lebanese national who entered the U.S. as a 
non-immigrant under an H1-B visa issued based on a petition 
by Eid’s employer Carolyn Pickett,1 a U.S. citizen. In October 
1999, Eid married Pickett and they began living together as 
roommates. Pickett filed an I-130 Petition the next month to 
have Eid legally established as her husband for immigration 
purposes. It was granted in December 1999.  
 Obtaining permanent residence based on marriage to 
an American citizen or legal permanent resident is a multi-
step process. First, the citizen or permanent resident spouse 
                                              
1
 Pickett is referred to in parts of the administrative record as 
Carolyn Rumsey, the name she used during a previous 
marriage.  
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must sponsor the alien by filing an I-130 Petition (if granted, 
it legally classifies the alien as the spouse of the sponsor). 
Once (or at the same time as) the sponsor files an I-130 
Petition, the alien must file an I-485 Application to Register 
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status.  
 On the basis of his classification as Pickett’s husband, 
per the granting of the I-130 Petition, Eid filed an I-485 
Application. During his interview with the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“INS”) in February 2001 as part of 
the application for permanent residence, and presumably in 
response to immigration officers questioning the legitimacy 
of the marriage, Eid withdrew his I-485 Application. At the 
same time, Pickett requested the withdrawal of her I-130 
Petition already granted in 1999, a request the CIS granted. 
Accompanying the withdrawal of the I-485 application, both 
Eid and Pickett gave sworn affidavits to the INS officer. In 
his sworn statement, Eid said that he married Pickett in order 
to stay in the U.S., the marriage was never consummated, and 
the two had “no intention on living together as husband and 
wife.” Pickett’s sworn statement was to similar effect. Their 
marriage was annulled in December 2002.  
 Removal proceedings began against Eid in December 
2001. In November 2003, he married Packard-Eid, an 
American citizen, with whom he had a son in 2006. Packard-
Eid filed a new I-130 Petition on Eid’s behalf in September 
2004. Citizenship and Immigration Services (the “CIS”) 
determined the marriage of Eid and Packard-Eid (collectively 
the “Eids”) to be genuine, but denied the I-130 Petition in 
December 2006. It concluded that it must deny Packard-Eid’s 
Petition under § 1154(c) because of Pickett’s “sham” Petition 
on Eid’s behalf and their respective statements to the INS.  
 Packard-Eid appealed to the BIA, which remanded to 
the CIS with instructions to issue a Notice of Intent to Deny 
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(“NOID”) and to allow the Eids to present evidence in 
support of the I-130 Petition. The CIS issued the NOID in 
July 2009. In response, Packard-Eid provided declarations 
from Pickett and Eid that they married out of a “naïve” belief 
that formal marriage and shared residence were sufficient to 
obtain permanent residence, along with a statement of 
Packard-Eid’s legal arguments against the denial. The CIS 
denied the I-130 Petition in September 2009, and Packard-Eid 
appealed to the BIA. It affirmed the CIS’s conclusion that § 
1154(c) barred the I-130 Petition, termed Pickett and Eid’s 
marriage “fraudulent,” and dismissed the appeal.  
B. Legal Background 
 The Eids filed a complaint with the District Court 
challenging the denial of the I-130 Petition in July 2011 and 
an amended complaint five months later. The first count of 
the amended complaint sought review of the BIA’s denial of 
the I-130 Petition under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706, while the remaining counts charged 
that the decision violated various constitutional provisions 
and international law.  
 Both the Eids and the CIS filed motions for summary 
judgment on the first count of the complaint (the “APA 
claim”), and the CIS filed a motion to dismiss the 
constitutional and international law counts for failure to state 
a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The 
District Court granted the CIS’s motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed the remaining counts for failure to 
state a claim. Eid and Packard-Eid filed a notice of appeal, 
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and in their subsequent brief they challenged both the order 
for summary judgment and the dismissal of the other counts.
2
   
III. Jurisdiction and Standards of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331. See Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 139 (3d Cir. 
2012) (holding that district courts have jurisdiction under the 
APA to review BIA decisions other than a final order of 
removal). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In 
cases reviewing final administrative decisions under the APA, 
“we review the district court’s summary judgment decision de 
novo, while ‘applying the appropriate standard of review to 
the agency’s decision.’” Concerned Citizens Alliance, Inc. v. 
Slater, 176 F.3d 686, 693 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Sierra Club 
v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 632 (6th Cir. 1997)). Under the APA, 
we review agency actions to determine whether they were 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).3 
                                              
2
 Removal proceedings against Eid continued parallel to this 
litigation and an immigration judge ordered Eid removed in 
March 2007. After appeal to the BIA, a petition for review, 
and remand to the immigration judge, the removal 
proceedings have been administratively closed pending the 
outcome of this appeal. 
 
3
 The District Court erroneously categorized the Eids’ APA 
claim as a request for review of the denial of an application 
for naturalization, and on that basis reviewed the Eids’ non-
constitutional claims de novo rather than under the more 
deferential APA standard. Because we review the District 
Court’s legal conclusions de novo and conclude that it 
reached the correct outcome, remand is unnecessary. Cf. S.H. 
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 Our Court “exercise[s] plenary review over a district 
court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6).” Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 
(3d Cir. 2012). In this review, “courts ‘accept all factual 
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any 
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be 
entitled to relief.’” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 
224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings 
Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In order to defeat 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, plaintiffs’ “[f]actual allegations must 
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level 
. . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
Thus, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief 
survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 679 (2009).  
III. Analysis 
A. APA Claim 
 The Eids assert several reasons why they believe the 
BIA’s denial of the I-130 Petition was arbitrary and 
capricious. We deal with each in turn.  
1. Level of Intent Required for “Purpose of 
Evading the Immigration Laws”  
                                                                                                     
v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 271 
(3d Cir. 2003) (“Even if the District Court applied the wrong 
standard of review, we may still uphold its decision if correct 
under the appropriate standard of review.”). 
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 The Eids’ first argument is that the BIA’s rejection of 
their I-130 Petition was improper because the statutory bar of 
8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)
4
 did not apply. It states in pertinent part: 
[N]o petition shall be approved if (1) the alien 
has previously been accorded, or has sought to 
be accorded, an immediate relative or preference 
status as the spouse of a citizen of the United 
States . . . by reason of a marriage determined by 
the Attorney General to have been entered into 
for the purpose of evading the immigration laws 
. . . . 
8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) (emphasis added). At base is the level of 
intent necessary for a marriage to be “for the purpose of 
evading the immigration laws.” The Eids argue specific intent 
to break immigration laws is required. The BIA, in contrast, 
concluded that Eid and Pickett’s “admissions that their 
marriage was entered for the sole purpose of procuring the 
beneficiary’s lawful status in the United States are sufficient 
basis” to trigger the § 1154(c) bar (emphasis added).  
 We defer to the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of 
ambiguous provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See INS v. 
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999); Sarango v. Att’y 
Gen., 651 F.3d 380, 383 (3d Cir. 2011). Under the familiar 
Chevron analysis, we ask first “whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue. If so, courts, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.” United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 
                                              
4
 This provision is also referred to as Section 204(c), based on 
its location in the Immigration and Nationality Act. We refer 
to it as § 1154(c) throughout.  
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292 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 
224 (3d Cir. 2004)) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the question at issue, we give “controlling weight” 
to the agency’s interpretation unless it is “arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. (quoting 
Chen, 381 F.3d at 224) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
this case, our first task is to determine whether the statutory 
language “for the purpose of evading” is ambiguous on the 
question of intent. 
 Our review for ambiguity “must begin with the text of 
the statute.” Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. C.I.R., 515 F.3d 162, 
170 (3d Cir. 2008). The INA does not define the terms 
“purpose” or “evade.”  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a). When words 
are left undefined, we have turned to “standard reference 
works such as legal and general dictionaries in order to 
ascertain” their ordinary meaning. Geiser, 527 F.3d at 294. A 
person’s “purpose” is “something that [he or she] sets before 
himself [or herself] as an object to be attained: an end or aim 
to be kept in view” – it is “an object, effect, or result aimed at, 
intended, or attained.” Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, Unabridged 1847 (1981). To “evade” is to “give 
someone the slip[,] . . . to manage to avoid the performance of 
(an obligation),” or to “circumvent” or “dodge.”  Id. at 787.  
 We could read the visa bar in § 1154(c) to apply only 
when the “object, effect, or result aimed at” in getting married 
was to violate the immigration laws. This interpretation is 
consistent with the Eids’ assertion that § 1154(c) requires a 
specific intent to violate the law. But § 1154(c) also supports 
a reading under which specific intent is not required, a 
reading adopted by the only Court of Appeals to have directly 
considered the issue. See Salas-Velasquez v. INS, 34 F.3d 
705, 707-08 (8th Cir. 1994). This interpretation is also 
reasonable, because the intended result of a faux marriage is 
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not to violate the law per se, but to obtain an immigration 
benefit to which a person is not otherwise entitled. Other 
circuit courts have suggested that intent to enter into a 
marriage solely to obtain immigration benefits is sufficient to 
trigger § 1154(c) without specifically distinguishing this 
intent from intent to evade the immigration laws. See, e.g., 
United States v. Islam, 418 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(“To obtain permanent residency, however, an alien must 
verify he entered into the marriage in good faith and not for 
the purpose of procuring his admission as an immigrant.” 
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c); 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 
U.S.C. § 1186(d)(1)(A)(i)(III))); Ferrante v. INS, 399 F.2d 
98, 104 (6th Cir. 1968) (“What he did with respect to the 
marriage was done with the intent to gain nonquota status and 
not for the purpose of entering into a continuing bona fide 
marriage.” (interpreting a previous version of § 1154(c))). 
 Because we believe that the statute is ambiguous with 
respect to the question of intent, we defer to the BIA’s 
reasonable interpretation and hold that when the Attorney 
General determines that an alien was accorded or sought to be 
accorded immediate relative or preference status on the basis 
of a marriage entered into solely to obtain immigration 
benefits, no additional evidence of intent is necessary to 
subject an alien to the bar of § 1154(c). This determination 
requires “substantial and probative” evidence of an attempt to 
receive immigration benefits based on a false marriage. See 
Matter of Tawfik, 20 I. & N. Dec. 166, 167 (BIA 1990). The 
Eids have never claimed that there is not substantial evidence 
that Eid and Pickett married to obtain immigration benefits. 
To the contrary, they have repeatedly acknowledged that the 
marriage was entirely a means to obtain the immigration 
benefit of  permanent residency for Eid. 
 The Eids argue nonetheless that grave consequences 
such as removal should not follow from what they describe as 
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a minor violation under the doctrine of de minimis non curat 
lex. See, e.g., In re Hammond, 27 F.3d 52, 57 n.7 (3d Cir. 
1994) (“The Latin means: ‘The law does not care for, or take 
notice of, very small or trifling matters. The law does not 
concern itself about trifles.’” (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary 388 (5th ed. 1979))). However, a marriage entered 
into solely to obtain immigration benefits not otherwise 
available without the marriage has as its purpose the evasion 
of immigration laws, and that triggers the bar of § 1154(c). 
While false statements, third-party involvement, and the 
exchange of money may be common markers of a sham 
marriage, they are not necessary under the statute to make 
that conclusion. Their absence does not render de minimis an 
unequivocal violation such as that of Eid and Pickett. 
Moreover, that Eid did not receive permanent residence, and 
that at the time of his I-485 Application he possessed a valid 
H1-B visa (a non-immigrant employer-sponsored visa for 
foreign workers in specialized occupations), fail to make the 
violation de minimis; the statute requires neither actually 
receiving immigration benefits nor immediately needing 
them. In any event, Eid did receive “an immediate relative or 
preference status as the spouse of a citizen of the United 
States” when Pickett’s I-130 Petition was granted, the exact 
immigration benefit § 1154(c) references. The bottom line is 
that, under the inflexible language of § 1154(c), merely 
seeking the benefit of immediate relative or preference status 
based on a sham marriage results in the automatic rejection of 
an I-130 Petition. Hence the BIA’s denial of the Eids’ de 
minimis argument was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 
2. Timely Retraction 
 The Eids contend that the District Court should have 
granted their timely retraction argument. Under that theory, 
Eid’s withdrawal of his application for permanent residency 
should “wash away” the attempt to garner benefits, 
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precluding the application of § 1154(c) and making the BIA’s 
decision to apply § 1154(c) erroneous.
5
 We disagree.  
 The basic principle of timely retraction or recantation 
is that where an alien voluntarily retracts a false statement 
before its falsehood is exposed (or about to be exposed), the 
effect of the false statement is cancelled out. See Matter of 
M—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 118 (BIA 1960); see also Valdez-Munoz 
v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The doctrine 
of timely recantation is of long standing and ameliorates what 
would otherwise be an unduly harsh result for some 
individuals, who, despite a momentary lapse, simply have 
humanity’s usual failings, but are being truthful for all 
practical purposes.”). Here, Pickett’s “retraction” of her I-130 
Petition occurred only after it had been approved and she and 
Eid were questioned regarding the purpose of their marriage. 
Even if the timely retraction doctrine were extended to 
include withdrawals of official forms, it would be most 
difficult to show that the withdrawal, after the Petition was 
filed (Eid “sought to be accorded” the benefit) and after the 
legitimacy of the marriage was called into question by 
immigration officials, was timely. Thus the timely retraction 
doctrine does not apply. 
                                              
5
 The BIA did not discuss timely retraction in its decision, 
likely because it was not raised in Packard-Eid’s BIA brief. 
However, because timely retraction was mentioned in the 
notice of appeal, it is considered administratively exhausted 
under the standards of our Court. See Joseph v. Att’y Gen., 
465 F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Under the liberal 
exhaustion policy . . . , an alien need not do much to alert the 
Board that he is raising an issue.”).  
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B. Constitutional Claims 
1. Procedural Due Process 
 In their appellate brief, the Eids assert that the 
procedures for denying an I-130 Petition under § 1154(c) 
violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because 
they do not afford an evidentiary hearing on the record before 
a neutral adjudicator. Because this claim was not raised 
before the District Court,
6
 it is waived. See In re Diet Drugs, 
706 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2013) (“It is axiomatic that 
arguments asserted for the first time on appeal are deemed to 
be waived and consequently are not susceptible to review in 
this Court absent exceptional circumstances.” (quoting Tri-M 
Grp., L.L.C. v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). This makes unnecessary 
any decision as to the merits of the Eids’ procedural due 
process claim. 
2. Eighth Amendment  
 The Eids contend that the denial of Packard-Eid’s I-
130 Petition violates their Eighth Amendment rights on the 
ground that removal would be an unconstitutionally 
disproportionate penalty. See U.S. Const., amend. VIII 
(“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
Even accepting the Eids’ contention that the denial of the 
Petition would necessarily result in removal, we are 
                                              
6
 The Eids raised a separate due process claim based on the 
right to marry before the District Court, which dismissed this 
count of the complaint for failure to statute a claim under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because the Eids 
did not pursue the right-to-marry claim before us, we do not 
address it here.  
14 
 
unpersuaded. As removal cannot violate the Eighth 
Amendment because it is not a criminal punishment, see 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) 
(“Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been 
consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal 
procedure.”), the denial of an I-130 Petition no doubt cannot 
do so, see Barmo v. Reno, 899 F. Supp. 1375, 1385 (E.D. Pa. 
1995) (rejecting a nearly identical Eighth Amendment 
challenge to §1154(c)); Stokes v. INS, 393 F. Supp. 24, 32 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). The District Court thus did not err in 
dismissing this count of the complaint for failure to state a 
claim.  
3. Equal Protection  
 Finally, the Eids assert that § 1154(c) violates the 
equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment by drawing an unconstitutional distinction 
between groups of aliens. In particular, they argue that aliens 
who successfully complete marriage fraud are eligible for a 
discretionary waiver of removal under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(1)(H), while those who merely attempt marriage 
fraud are not. We discern no such distinction. Section 
1227(a)(1)(H) states, in relevant part:  
The provisions of this paragraph relating to the 
removal of aliens within the United States on 
the ground that they were inadmissible at the 
time of admission as aliens described in section 
1182(a)(6)(C)(i) of this title, whether willful or 
innocent, may, in the discretion of the Attorney 
General, be waived for any alien (other than an 
alien described in paragraph (4)(D)) who-- 
(i)(I) is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a 
citizen of the United States or of an alien 
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lawfully admitted to the United States for 
permanent residence; and 
(II) was in possession of an immigrant visa or 
equivalent document and was otherwise 
admissible to the United States at the time of 
such admission except for those grounds of 
inadmissibility specified under paragraphs 
(5)(A) and (7)(A) of section 1182(a) of this title 
which were a direct result of that fraud or 
misrepresentation. 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). In lay language, § 1227(a)(1)(H) 
allows the Attorney General to waive in her/his discretion the 
removal of certain aliens who were inadmissible (that is, not 
eligible for legal entry into the United States) at the time they 
entered the country and are facing removal because they were 
not admissible at the time of entry. Only aliens with a United 
States citizen or legal permanent resident relative (such as a 
spouse) are eligible.  
 These waivers are available to aliens who were 
inadmissible because they committed certain kinds of 
immigration fraud as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). 
An alien is inadmissible under that provision if he or she, “by 
fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to 
procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, 
other documentation, or admission into the United States or 
other benefit provided under this chapter . . . .” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (emphases added). Because of the “sought 
to procure” language, attempted fraud and completed fraud 
are equally grounds for inadmissibility under 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). Contrary to the Eids’ assertions, nothing 
in the text of either § 1227(a)(1)(H) or § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) 
suggests that attempted and completed frauds or willful 
misrepresentations are not equally subject to waiver. Nor is 
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there any reason to believe that the BIA or the CIS in practice 
grant waivers only for such completed acts. In support of their 
claim, the Eids cite only the bare text of § 1227(a)(1)(H) and 
a single case where an alien who entered the United States 
based on a fraudulent marriage was granted a waiver, see 
Vasquez v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1003, 1010-17 (9th Cir. 2010), 
without any evidence of otherwise eligible aliens being 
denied waivers because their frauds or willful 
misrepresentations were merely attempted rather than 
completed. In this context, the District Court did not err in 
dismissing this count for failure to state a claim.
7
 
IV. Conclusion 
 We recognize that, by our holding on § 1154(c), we 
subject many aliens who, like Eid, entered a good-faith 
second marriage to denial of their spouse’s I-130 Petition. 
Regrettably, this effect is the logical consequence of the 
absolute language of § 1154(c). Once the Government 
determines that it has accorded a mock marriage the benefit 
requested in an I-130 Petition, or even that the benefit is 
sought by that marriage, further Petitions are foreclosed. We 
thus affirm the District Court. 
 
 
                                              
7
 Under their APA claim, the Eids similarly argued that the 
claimed distinction between groups of aliens was arbitrary 
and capricious. We reject that claim for the reasons stated 
above.  
